Ahead of the 31st anniversary of Operation Storm, previously unknown details about the strategic operation that preceded the liberation of Knin and broke the so-called Republic of Serbian Krajina emerge from the memoirs of General Rahim Ademi.
As Croatia prepares to celebrate the 31st anniversary of the military-police operation "Storm" on August 5, 2026, testimonies about the crucial action that preceded it are coming to light. This is Operation "Summer '95," whose planning and execution were described in detail by General Rahim Ademi in his book "Only the Truth - War Diary of a Croatian Army General," published in 2021.
According to Ademi, as reported by Večernji list, Operation Summer '95 began on July 25, 1995, and he learned about it ten days earlier. The goal was to liberate Bosansko Grahovo and Glamoč, thereby creating the conditions for the final strike on occupied territories. During preparations, at the request of General Gotovina, and to ensure secrecy, the name of the Livno Operational Group was changed to the Northern Operational Group.
General Ademi recalls how it all began on the morning of July 15, 1995, at the command of the Livno Operational Group in Gornji Rujani. "On the morning of July 15, 1995, shortly before 8 a.m., General Gotovina arrived at the command of the Livno Operational Group in Gornji Rujani, and Korade and I welcomed him," Ademi writes. A helicopter then took them to a meeting with Defense Minister Gojko Šušak at his home in Široki Brijeg, where they were also greeted by the Defense Minister of Herceg-Bosna, Vladimir Šoljić, Brigadier Ljubo Ćesić Rojs, and others.
Minister Šušak then communicated the decision to them: "Gentlemen officers, dear friend Šoljić, the strategic time and moment for the liberation of Bosansko Grahovo and Glamoč has come. We must not miss this opportunity, especially after the magnificent victory in Operation Skok-2." Immediately afterward, he called President Franjo Tuđman, who approved the operation and requested that it be carried out within ten days, meaning it would begin on July 25, 1995.
A key moment in the planning occurred at a meeting on July 22, 1995, in Gornji Rujani, attended by the Chief of the General Staff of the Croatian Army, General Zvonimir Červenko, Admiral Davor Domazet Lošo, Major General Vinko Vrbanac, General Ante Gotovina, and numerous unit commanders, including Korade, Filipović, Čačić, Sopta, Kotromanović, Glasnović, and Jelić. Ademi notes that Admiral Domazet Lošo presented a "completely unrealistic" intelligence assessment, warning of vast enemy forces and possible armored interventions from several locations, including Crvena Zemlja, Crni Lug, Resanovci, and Drvar.
Seeing the concern on the commanders' faces, Ademi asked to speak and presented his own assessment. "Mr. Minister, Chief of Staff, gentlemen generals and commanders, if the situation is as Admiral Domazet has presented it to us, we might as well start packing our bags and flee to Italy. I will give you an accurate assessment of the enemy forces," Ademi said, after which he saw "optimism and satisfaction" on the faces of those present.
In his book, the general emphasized the superiority of the Croatian forces: "Compared to the enemy, the combat capability of our units was far better in all respects: in training, readiness, and preparedness, we were armed with modern means for conducting anti-infantry, anti-armor, and anti-aircraft combat." He also highlighted the high morale of the soldiers who felt that "the day of final liberation was approaching." Operation Summer '95 was planned exclusively at the command of the Northern Operational Group in Livno, and the execution plans were not sent for review and approval to the General Staff of the Croatian Army because there was no need.
The day after the meeting, on July 23, 1995, Ademi and Gotovina undertook a series of actions to raise combat readiness. Gotovina then entrusted Ademi with the operational conduct of the operation, taking upon himself political and intelligence activities. Minister Šušak held the final meeting on July 24 at 2 p.m. with more than twenty commanders and chiefs, including Brigadiers Ćesić Rojs, Primorac, Filipović, Korade, Romić, Sopta, Kotromanović, Glasnović, special forces commander Jelić, Major Skejo, artillery chief Rajčić, communications chief Ribičić, Colonel Nakić, and others.
According to Ademi's notes, Šušak then uttered words that went down in history: "The attack begins on July 25, 1995, at 5 a.m., it must be successful, and every individual must be aware of their responsibility because this is the decisive battle for the Republic of Croatia. Anyone not ready for this decisive battle should freely seek their place on another planet." All commanders then confirmed their readiness to carry out the task.
The strategic significance of these operations was also discussed by retired Lieutenant General Krešimir Ćosić on HRT. He recalled that there was a strong prejudice in the international community that the Croatian Army could not win. "In September 1994, the minister and I spoke with the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense. 'We are with you, we support you, but you don't have the strength.' So, after Maslenica, that feeling in the international community was still very much present, and something really had to be shown on the ground," said Ćosić.
General Ademi concludes in his book that Operation Summer '95 was of crucial importance: "The meeting at the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Croatia in Široki Brijeg, where the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Dr. Franjo Tuđman, at the proposal of the Minister of Defense, ordered the execution of the strategic operation for the liberation of Bosansko Grahovo and Glamoč, was truly a historic meeting, because the liberation of Bosansko Grahovo and Glamoč meant the end of the so-called Republic of Serbian Krajina."
