Historian Dr. Davor Marijan, in a major interview with HKV on the 31st anniversary of Operation Storm, reveals historical facts about the preparations, the key to success, and today's political reinterpretations of the operation.
On the occasion of the 31st anniversary of the military-police operation Storm, HKV journalist Davor Dijanović spoke with historian Dr. Davor Marijan, author of the foundational scholarly study "Storm." In an interview published on August 6, 2026, on Narod.hr, Marijan discussed key historical facts, revealing how neglecting the context of 1990 and 1991 creates a distorted picture of "expelled Serbian children."
Marijan revealed that his 2007 book is a summary of a larger manuscript written in 2001 at the behest of the Minister of Defense's Cabinet. He also announced a new manuscript on the final phase of the Homeland War, from October 1994 to the end of 1995, which he plans to complete next year, in which Operation Storm will be "significantly larger and more detailed," while the fundamental conclusions remain unchanged and further reinforced.
The historian emphasizes that Operation Storm is often mistakenly reduced to just four days of fighting in public discourse. "Realistically, the first, so to speak, 'cornerstone' for Storm was laid in January 1992 when the Directive for conducting a strategic offensive was drafted in the Croatian Army's General Staff," Marijan said. The directive was created after the Sarajevo ceasefire took effect as a preventive war plan, and all operational zones and the Croatian Navy developed their own orders with river-themed code names.
In 1993, minor adjustments were made to the plans, and in late summer 1994, at the request of President Franjo Tuđman, work began on a new war plan, which by the end of the year received the code name Flash. From November 1994 to June 1995, the Croatian Army and the Croatian Defense Council conducted a series of operations that changed the situation on the battlefield. "It is, as one English historian (whose work I don't particularly appreciate) might say, undoubtedly the result of a process of 'long duration,'" Marijan emphasized.
Although international circumstances aligned in the summer of 1995 and the United States supported the operation, Marijan believes that the strength of the Croatian Army was decisive. "But if you don't have a military force capable of such an undertaking, political approval won't do you much good," he asserted. "Therefore, I would say that in the end, the key to success was the military capability of the Croatian Army."
One of the most contentious issues today remains the departure of the Serbian population. Marijan is unequivocal: "There is no doubt that on the afternoon of August 4, 1995 (meaning after 10-12 hours of the operation), the Supreme Defense Council of the RSK decided that, due to the threat to a large part of northern Dalmatia and Lika, they would 'proceed with the planned evacuation of the population unfit for combat from the municipalities of Knin, Benkovac, Obrovac, Drniš, and Gračac.'"
The population was to be evacuated to the area of Srb and Donji Lapac, and the evacuation of civilians began on the night of August 4/5. "With this act, the RSK effectively ceased to exist, because everything that happened on the battlefield was just the collapse of a house of cards," Marijan concluded. The historian emphasizes that this was the final act of a process that did not begin in August 1990 with the rebellion of part of the Serbs, but much earlier under communism, for example through the practice of not displaying republican flags in places with a Serbian majority population.
Marijan does not spare criticism for organizations that portray Storm exclusively through the lens of crimes. "I share the opinion of historians and other scholars who believe that the alleged 'confrontations' with the past by various organizations and initiatives are political activism that proliferated after 2000," he said. "The cliché of 'confronting the past' serves to allow uninvited amateurs to intrude into the field of historical science."
He specifically addressed Documenta, Center for Dealing with the Past and the Civic Committee for Human Rights: "In the case of Documenta and the Civic Committee, one cannot even find basic biographical information about their leaders based on which one could conclude what makes them competent for historical issues."
Marijan is convinced that without Storm, Croatia would not be a member of the European Union and NATO today. He clarified that he made this statement as a war participant, not as a historian. "I do not engage in predicting the future or in fantasies that some, even historians, call 'alternative history,' but I doubt that Croatia would be a member of the EU and NATO today without Storm," he stated.
The historian particularly criticized the interpretation of historical events out of context, which, as he says, is popular in Serbia and among the aforementioned activists. "This is the kind of approach where, if you ignore the 'inconvenient' context, you can prove anything. So you forget what happened in 1990, what happened in 1991, as well as the position of the non-Serb population in the occupied territory, and you get August 1995 and 'expelled Serbian children,'" Marijan warned.
When asked about myths, Marijan concludes that there are fewer and fewer of them, recalling the period after President Tuđman's death: "Fortunately, there is less and less of that. When President Franjo Tuđman died, there followed a period of terrible disparagement of the operation, but also of the entire Homeland War and the Croatian Army." During that period, he says, claims were spread that the Americans planned Storm or that a transmitter on Ćelavac was destroyed by an American F-16, not a Croatian MIG-21. He also commented on interpretations from Bosnia and Herzegovina, where it is still claimed that the war was agreed upon or that the Army of BiH liberated Croatia. "I have the impression that you couldn't agree with Bosniak interpreters of the war even on elementary facts, such as that two plus two equals four," he concluded.
