Journalist and analyst Ivica Granić analyzed why the dominant political and media narrative in Serbia still avoids confronting responsibility for aggression, maintaining a victimhood myth that serves internal mobilization and foreign policy.
In his analysis for Hrvatski glasnik, journalist, communication expert, and political analyst Ivica Granić emphasizes that Operation Storm represented a clean and justified military victory against a four-year armed uprising, yet the dominant political and media portrayal in Serbia still operates as if it were 1989. Although a segment of the public recognizes the aggression, war crimes, and defeat, the ruling structure and most media deliberately refuse to draw conclusions, maintaining a narrative in which Operation Storm is seen only as a tragedy.
Granić points out that the victimhood narrative is extremely useful for political elites in Serbia. Operation Storm is systematically portrayed exclusively as ethnic cleansing and tragedy, not as a military defeat after four years of armed rebellion and siege of Croatian cities. "As long as the story is kept to 'we are victims,' politicians do not have to answer for the war policy of the 90s, nor for the failed criminal strategy of 'all Serbs in one state,'" Granić states.
Such a narrative skillfully avoids accountability for the failed and criminal policy of creating a Greater Serbia. "It is easier to say they betrayed us, an international conspiracy, the Vatican, Croats are genocidal, etc., than to admit that the criminal project of Greater Serbia was both morally and militarily flawed," the analyst emphasizes.
As one of the key reasons why the narrative does not change, Granić cites institutional amnesia fueled by revisionism. "The education system, military museums, state television, and most mainstream media in Serbia continue to promote a version in which Serbs 'defended their centuries-old hearths,'" he writes. The Hague Tribunal's verdicts are largely ignored or relativized, and there is no systematic confrontation with responsibility for aggression, such as Germany had after 1945.
Granić adds that the leadership of Croatian Serbs also bears enormous responsibility for this state of affairs. Revisionism and threats like "we will return Krajina" serve internal mobilization and foreign policy, especially in conditions where Serbia balances between the EU and Russia, where anti-Western and anti-Croatian sentiment still sells well.
The analysis also touches on the geopolitical context. "As long as there is an international context in which Serbian nationalism can rely on Russian support and the West's relative disinterest in this region, there is no strong external pressure to change the narrative," Granić writes for Hrvatski glasnik.
Underlying it all is a powerful psychological mechanism. "Collective defeat is hard to accept," Granić points out, adding that this very framework continues to serve the dominant elite and the majority media space. Nevertheless, he emphasizes that this does not mean the entire nation is like that. "It is not that Serbs as a people have drawn no conclusions. Some have; there are people both in Serbia and among Croatian Serbs who acknowledge the aggression, crimes, and defeat," he concludes.
The text ends with a message to readers: "Stay healthy, cheerful, but also ready. History does not stop at anniversaries. Happy Victory Day to us."
