The long-time director of the Croatian Memorial Documentation Centre of the Homeland War presented evidence in the podcast 'Historical Dialogues' of the continuity of Greater Serbian policy from the 19th century to the 1990s.
Dr. Ante Nazor, the long-time director of the Croatian Memorial Documentation Centre of the Homeland War, was a guest on the podcast 'Historical Dialogues' hosted by Ivan Tepeš. During the conversation, he presented a series of documents confirming that the Homeland War was an act of Greater Serbian aggression with a continuity dating back to the mid-19th century, and that the key plan for uniting rebel Serb territories was completed just before Operation Storm, which permanently halted that project.
Nazor pointed out that the roots of Greater Serbian expansionist policy lie in Načertanije from the mid-19th century, the official program of the then Serbian state. The western borders of that project coincide with the territory under Ottoman rule since the 14th century, and the envisioned line stretched from Virovitica, through Pakrac, Karlovac, and Ogulin to Karlobag.
He also mentioned Stevan Moljević's program 'Homogeneous Serbia' and Draža Mihailović's Instructions, but paid special attention to a lesser-known study from 1939, published in Zagreb. 'The content of that text is identical to the rhetoric of the 1990s. It precisely lists the territories planned to be carved out of the Banovina of Croatia, which almost completely match the borders of the self-styled SAO Krajina,' Nazor emphasized, noting that this source debunks the thesis that the Serb rebellion was a reaction to fear of the restoration of the NDH, since the NDH did not even exist in 1939.
Nazor rejected the narrative that the Homeland War began with the multi-party elections of 1990 and the HDZ's victory. He reminded that at the Eighth Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia in September 1987, Slobodan Milošević's faction prevailed, which then took over the media and imposed theses about the endangerment of Serbs. These ideas were also fueled by the SANU Memorandum from September 1986.
The first demands for the establishment of the SAO Krajina appeared in February 1988 and were repeated in September 1989 at the Association of Writers of Serbia. This was followed by rallies, from the gathering near Knin on February 28, 1989, to the massive anti-Croatian rally on Petrova Gora on March 4, 1990, where threats were also made against the leader of Croatian communists, Ivica Račan. 'In February 1988, the HDZ was nowhere in sight,' Nazor concluded.
Just one week after the elections, on May 14, 1990, the JNA issued an order to confiscate the weapons of the Territorial Defense in Croatia. Nazor believes it is unrealistic to expect that the Croatian leadership could have prevented this because it did not control even half of the police system. It was only on August 5, 1990, that the course for the First Croatian Policeman began. By July 18, 1991, the JNA had fully sided with Serbian policy.
He also addressed the role of the HOS, which appeared in June 1991 as an armed party group. Although it was a paramilitary formation, it immediately placed itself at the disposal of the legal authorities and was subordinate to the commands of the official armed forces on the battlefields. There were about three thousand HOS members in total, of whom about a thousand were armed. The commander of the 9th HOS Battalion, Joza Radanović, made the decision to disband the unit on January 16, 1992, the day after Croatia's international recognition.
Nazor presented a document from November 1, 1991, in which the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Serbia proposes to the Government to secure funds for 50,000 Serbs in Croatia under arms. 'Serbia was the unequivocal aggressor, and the main executor of that policy was the JNA,' he emphasized, adding that the rebel Serbs were joined by the Montenegrin MUP and territorial defense.
A documented plan for the territorial linking of Krajina with Serbs in BiH and Serbia exists from October 1991, and the draft constitution of the united Republic of Srpska was completed just before Operation Storm. 'Operation Storm permanently thwarted that project,' Nazor concluded, stressing that the war could only have been avoided by Croatia's capitulation.
Speaking about the international context, Nazor reminded that the US, Russia, and Germany were initially in favor of preserving Yugoslavia, and NATO officers estimated that the JNA would crush Croatia within two weeks. The turning point was the destruction of Vukovar, after which there was strong engagement by Austrian, German, and Vatican diplomacy for Croatia's recognition.
A key prerequisite was the guarantee of national minority rights, so in December 1991, the Parliament adopted the Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities. At the European Community meeting on December 16, 1991, Germany announced it would recognize Croatia and Slovenia, and international recognition followed on January 15, 1992. Croatia was admitted to the UN on May 22, 1992, which marked the pinnacle of international affirmation. Upon his return on May 24, President Franjo Tuđman stated that the war could only have been avoided by accepting Serbia's terms and capitulating.
According to the Law on Croatian Veterans, the official end of the Homeland War is June 30, 1996, but Nazor believes that the real end could be considered August 23, 1996, when the Agreement on Normalization of Relations between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was signed, which the Parliament ratified on September 20. The last Croatian defender to be killed was Vinko Pinjuh, a member of the 5th Guards Brigade, who died on November 10, 1995, after being wounded in combat operations.
Nazor also emphasized that about nine thousand Serbs fought side by side with Croats, which is why guilt should not be generalized, and he rejected theses about an alleged division of BiH between Tuđman and Milošević in Karađorđevo, calling them 'a media lie and fabrication.'
