A Kyiv Independent columnist suggests the Kremlin is planning a new mobilization, intensified strikes, and a decisive offensive to achieve a 'fundamental turning point' before exhaustion becomes unsustainable.
Moscow is gearing up for what could be its last major strategic effort in the war against Ukraine. According to a Kyiv Independent column, the Kremlin is planning a 'final push' this autumn, including a new wave of mobilization and an escalation of attacks, with the aim of achieving a 'korennoy perelom v voyne' (Russian for 'fundamental turning point in the war').
The column's author had already predicted earlier this year that the Kremlin would consider 2026 crucial for achieving this 'fundamental turning point' in order to close the most costly and exhausting phase of the conflict on its own terms. The 'war of attrition' strategy that the Kremlin had relied on was already losing or had completely lost its chance of success, dragging Russia toward its own exhaustion faster than Ukraine was losing its ability to resist.
These assessments are further supported by statements from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who revealed on August 11 in his evening address that Ukrainian military intelligence had obtained internal Russian documents. "Everything is confirmed by internal Russian documents: they are preparing this for autumn, right after the fake parliamentary elections," Zelensky said. According to him, Putin's plan is not overly complex: to create the impression that Russians support the war, since all parties currently allowed in the process are, in one way or another, against peace. "Then, after the so-called elections, he plans an additional rapid mobilization of several hundred thousand Russians by the end of this year, and the same number next year. This is on top of the recruitment they are trying to fill through contracts," Zelensky added. The Ukrainian president also stressed that Kyiv is preparing measures to make it as difficult as possible for Russia to implement these plans.
The decision for a new escalation does not come in a vacuum. Within Russia, negative processes fueled by the war are growing. In early July 2026, long lines were recorded at gas stations in Novosibirsk, and fuel shortages of gasoline and diesel spread to more than 40 Russian regions. Such signs of economic pressure further narrow the Kremlin's maneuvering space.
To finance a new 'strategic offensive,' the regime, according to the column's author, will have to resort to further state monopolization of the economy, including reserves and forms of 'dekulakization' aimed at the local oligarchy. Without this, there is simply nowhere to draw the necessary funds.
Strategically, the plan is expected to unfold in several phases. First comes a new round of mobilization and further operational buildup of Russian forces within Ukraine. Then, intensification of long-range strikes across Ukrainian territory with the aim of significantly weakening Ukraine's defense capabilities. Finally, the ground offensive itself with 'fresh forces' and potentially at a 'fresh location,' after the current offensive operation in the Sloviansk and Kramatorsk area has yielded limited results.
On the domestic front, the Kremlin will seek to further militarize society, turning Russia into a single military camp. Any form of opposition activity will be quickly and harshly punished, because a large-scale mobilization cannot be carried out while 'popular unrest' smolders. Maintaining the upcoming parliamentary elections in a calm and controlled atmosphere has therefore become unquestionable for the regime.
On the international stage, Moscow will try by all means to minimize or block effective aid to Ukraine, especially military-technical and financial assistance, so that such aid does not change the combat capability of Ukrainian forces before the 'final push' begins. At the same time, Moscow has not received full support from its main strategic ally, Beijing, whom the column's author calls 'Chinese comrades.' China has never escalated its involvement in the war to a level that would actually cost Beijing anything, which has further affected the Kremlin's strategic position.
The Kremlin, according to the column's author, has reached a point where procrastination has become a matter of survival. The choice has fallen on a new round of 'intensified effort' instead of sliding into a regime of 'war on a natural fade' and the de facto status of 'no peace, no war.' It remains to be seen whether this 'final push' will be enough to turn the tide of the conflict or will only deepen Russia's exhaustion.
Note: This is an op-ed column from the Kyiv Independent that reflects the author's opinion and does not necessarily reflect the editorial stance.
