From the second half of 2022 to mid-2026, the Eurosystem paid out around 370 billion euros to commercial banks in the eurozone, while the Croatian National Bank (CNB) paid Croatian banks 1.5 billion euros-more than the cost of the Pelješac Bridge.
An analysis published on Crodex.net on August 19, 2026, raises an uncomfortable question about the real distribution of economic power within the European Union. Based on the data that served as its foundation, from the second half of 2022 through mid-2026, the Eurosystem paid out approximately 370 billion euros to commercial banks within the eurozone.
In Croatia, during the same period, the Croatian National Bank (CNB) paid out around 1.5 billion euros to commercial banks. The author of the analysis, Ivan Lovrinović, compares this amount to the Pelješac Bridge and its access roads: Croatian banks received more money from the CNB in three and a half years than the cost of that massive infrastructure project.
After a period of extremely low, even negative, interest rates, the European Central Bank (ECB) began aggressively raising rates to curb inflation. Citizens felt the cost of loans rise, businesses faced more expensive financing, and governments saw higher interest payments on public debt.
At the same time, commercial banks began posting massive earnings from interest on the money they hold with central banks. An individual keeping money in a bank account often receives very little interest, while a bank can earn a return on excess liquidity held at the central bank that is several times higher.
The analysis highlights that many European central banks, due to the consequences of previous monetary policies and the sharp rise in interest rates, have been pushed into a very difficult financial position. In parallel, commercial banks in many countries have been achieving record profits.
If a central bank, due to losses, is no longer able to pay profits into the state budget, the space for financing public needs shrinks. Ultimately, the cost falls on citizens, whether through taxes, public debt, or a decline in the quality of public services.
One of the foundations of the European monetary system is the ECB's independence from political influence. However, the analysis questions how much democratic control an institution should have when its decisions have enormous consequences for citizens, the economy, states, and banks.
Citizens have the power to change the government and parliament, and they can punish politicians at the ballot box, but they have no say in the decisions of the ECB's Governing Council. Political authorities remain accountable to citizens for the outcomes of economic decisions, even though many of the key decisions are not made by them.
"If we tax banks, they will stop lending to the economy"
When a proposal arises to impose additional taxes on banks' windfall profits, this warning quickly follows. The analysis does not dismiss it outright but raises a key question: is the banking system subordinated to the economy, or has the economy become subordinated to the banking system?
The problem, the analysis notes, is not that banks make profits, but that the entire system is set up so that profits are privatized while risks and consequences are socialized. When banks reap huge profits, it is presented as the market at work. When central banks incur losses, the consequences spill over into public finances.
When citizens see their loan installments rise, it is called monetary policy. When citizens demand higher interest on savings, they are told that the market determines the price of money. And when the banking system needs liquidity and stability, the entire monetary system steps in to help.
The conclusion of the analysis is unequivocal: if institutions that are not directly accountable to voters can make decisions that generate hundreds of billions of euros in effects for the financial sector, the question of democratic control becomes a question of the future of European society.
