Directive No. 8 of the VRS Main Staff from August 3, 1995, reveals the irrational optimism of Ratko Mladić and his headquarters, who planned to reclaim lost territory while the Croatian Army prepared Operation Storm.
Thanks to documents released through the work of the Hague Tribunal, Directive No. 8 of the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) from August 3, 1995, signed the day before the start of Operation "Storm," has come to public attention. The directive was personally signed by the VRS Main Staff commander, General Ratko Mladić, and bore the title "Offensive Operation of the VRS on the Grahovo-Glamoč Front." The document was created just a few days after the VRS suffered its heaviest defeat in its existence during Operation "Summer-95," losing about 1,600 square kilometers of territory and towns with city status: Bosansko Grahovo and Glamoč.
The fall of Glamoč and Grahovo could not be ignored, and General Mladić stated in Knin on July 30 that the Croatian forces, by capturing these towns, had made a "crucial mistake" that would cost them dearly. His deputy, Lieutenant General Manojlo Milovanović, Chief of the VRS Main Staff, stated a day later in Bosanski Petrovac that he had received orders from Republika Srpska President Radovan Karadžić for a counterstrike.
"It is not known whether the army will accomplish the assigned task in 24 hours or 24 days, but it is clear that it will very quickly liberate the occupied territories," Milovanović said at the time. Accordingly, preparations included bringing reinforcements to western Bosnia and establishing forward command posts in Drvar and Baraći near Mrkonjić Grad. The operation to reclaim territory was named "Vaganj-95," and it was planned to last 20 to 30 days, with the attack starting at 6 a.m. on August 5.
The directive anticipated that Croatian forces and the 7th Corps of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ABiH) from Travnik intended to capture Drvar, Mlinište, Šipovo, and Donji Vakuf, and then Bosanski Petrovac and Jajce. The conclusion was that the goal was to cut off the Knin region, but no one on the Serbian side predicted a direct attack on Knin. Operation "Vaganj-95" planned the engagement of the First Operational Group in the Grahovo area and the Second Operational Group in the Glamoč-Kupres direction, with defense by the 30th Infantry Division and actions by the Third Tactical Group near Bihać.
On August 3, the commander of the Serbian paramilitary forces in Croatia, General Mile Mrkšić, contacted the VRS Main Staff "for coordination and planning of further offensive actions in the Grahovo-Livno direction." However, his security assistant, Colonel Rade Rašeta, was skeptical. He believed that in the western part of Republika Srpska, "there are almost no units capable of offensive actions, which the VRS conceals," and that "there is no practical cooperation or coordination with the VRS." Rašeta's assessment proved accurate about ten days later.
The collapse of the Army of Serbian Krajina (SVK) in "Storm" did not stop Mladić's plans. In the first ten days of August, Serbian forces were reinforced with units from the entire territory of Republika Srpska, including a light infantry brigade from the Drina Corps, part of the 65th Protective Motorized Regiment from Han Pijesak, and the Diversionary Detachment of the VRS Main Staff from Bijeljina, totaling about 2,000 soldiers. These forces proceeded to implement "Vaganj-95" in the Drvar-Bosansko Grahovo direction.
After "Storm," the Split Military District Command took over command as the Joint Croatian Forces Command, including units of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO). The forces were divided into operational groups "Otrić," "Sajković," and "Vrba." On the night of August 12/13, northwest of Bosansko Grahovo in the Derale area, Serbian forces broke through the defense line of the 141st Brigade of the Croatian Army (HV), which had about 1,200 mostly inexperienced soldiers. During this, the brigade lost 15 soldiers killed.
Croatian forces from OG "Sajković" halted the attack on August 13, and a day later the Split Military District launched a counterattack with reinforcements from the 4th and 7th Guards Brigades. The counterattack ended on August 15 with a significant shift of the front line toward Drvar, concluding the attempt to implement "Vaganj-95" in a heavy defeat and the loss of the entire Grahovo Field.
Operation "Vaganj-95" raises questions about the rationality of its authors. The preceding months provided no grounds for optimism: the VRS lost Kupres and part of the Kupres plateau in November 1994, and by the end of the year, part of the Livno Field in Operation "Winter-94." Attempts to reclaim territory in January 1995 yielded no results, and Croatian forces in April ("Skok-1") and June ("Skok-2") moved the front line on Dinara, Šator, and the Livno Field. Despite all this, Mladić and Milovanović seemed not to register even "Storm," and reality caught up with them from August 12 to 15, heralding even greater defeats in September and October through Operations "Maestral" and "Southern Move."
